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Recent Cases
CONTRACrs-"ExPIEss" OR1 "IMPIED"-WHAT NEED BE SHOWN IN A
FAmmy BELAIONsHIp-At the age of two the plaintiff was taken into
the home of Mr. and Mrs. Oxley, daughter and son-in-law of deceased,
who lived with deceased, Mrs. Victor, and cared for her. The plaintiff's
father lived as a tenant on a near-by farm owned by the deceased,
but the plaintiff, no relation to the deceased, lived with the Oxleys the
greater part of the time, establishing a "family relationship." Both Mr.
and Mrs. Oxley having died by 1949, the plaintiff, now age 26, ex-
pressed his intention to leave, but was persuaded to stay on by the
defendant. During this time the plaintiff cleaned house, cooked meals,
and generally ran the household. The mental and physical condition
of the deceased deteriorated during the time the plaintiff cared for
her, and because she so requested, the plaintiff remained with her
constantly. Four disinterested witnesses testified to the effect that the
deceased had told them she expected the plaintiff to be well paid.
Having previously been paid for all services he had rendered the
deceased, the plaintiff seeks to recover for services rendered to the
deceased during the last two years of her life. The lower court allowed
recovery. Held: Reversed on an instruction which, in effect, directed
the jury to find that the plaintiff's debt existed in fact. The Court said
the jury should have been allowed to ascertain if the decedent owed
the debt. In their discussion of the case the Court expressed the view
that the plaintiff could recover upon the showing of an implied-in-fact
contract, where, to overcome the presumption of gratuity arising out
of the family relationship, an "express contract" need be established
for services claimed. Victor's Executor v. Monson, 283 S.W. 2d 175
(Ky. 1955).
The Kentucky Court has continually laid down the rule that where
a family relationship exists by consanguinity, and sometimes affinity,1
a presumption is raised that the services were rendered gratuitously.
2
Where parties live in a close family relationship, each contributing
work or money to the common cause and each receiving mutual
benefit, an "express contract" must be shown to refute this presump-
1 Lucius' Admr. v. Owen, 198 Ky. 114, 248 SW 495 (1923) (father-in-law,
son-in-law); Bolling v. Bolling, 146 Ky. 363, 142 SW 387 (1912) uncle, nephew).2 Walker v. Dills Adhir., 186 Ky. 638, 218 SW 247 (1920); Corbin's Exr's v.
Corbin, 302 Ky. 208, 194 SW 2d 65 (1946); Combs v. Cole, 307 Ky. 651, 212
SW 2d 113 (1943); Sword v. Moore's Admr., 303 Ky. 507, 198 SW 2d 215
(1946).
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tion. There will be no "implied contract" raised in favor of any person
occupying such a relationship for recompense for mutual services
rendered.3 Only where the services rendered are extraordinary, 4 or
non-personal in nature5 will the Court permit an "implied contract" to
warrant recovery.
There are three types of contracts: (1) express contracts, (2) im-
plied-in-fact contracts, and (3) implied-in-law contracts. An express
contract is one in which the terms are stated by the parties. If the
agreement or mutual assent is manifested in words, oral or written, the
contract is said to be express. On the other hand, where the mutual
undertaking of the parties is inferred from their conduct alone, with-
out spoken or written words, the contract is said to be implied-in-fact.
In either case an actual agreement is manifested. The only difference,
therefore, between an express contract and an implied-in-fact contract
rests in the mode of proof required to establish the mutual undertak-
ing of the parties.0 It is said that there is no distinction in legal effect
as to the two types of contracts; the only distinction being in the man-
ner through which mutual assent is manifested by the parties.7 A con-
tract implied in law is one in which a promise is implied by law for
the purpose of affording a remedy without which injustice would re-
sult. The circumstances need not show that a promise was ever made
or intended.
Since the family tie gives rise to a presumption of gratuity on the
part of the one who renders the services, the fundamental question is
to determine which type of contract will be sufficient to rebut this
presumption. The failure of the Kentucky Court to consistently recog-
nize the distinction among the three types of contracts in the family
relationship cases and its ambiguous reference to an "express contract"
in many of these cases has made it difficult to ascertain what must be
shown to establish a claim for services in a family relationship situation.
The Kentucky Court as early as 1833 indicated that a son might
recover from his father's estate for labor done by him upon proof of
3 Conway v. Conway, 130 Ky. 218, 113 SW 94 (1908); Oliver v. Gardner,
192 Ky. 89, 232 SW 418 (1921); Combs v. Cole, 307 Ky. 651, 212 SW 2d 113
(1943).4 fumble v. Humble, 152 Ky. 160, 153 SW 249 (1913) (5 years); Allen v.
Smith, 208 Ky. 207, 270 SW 782 (1925) (5 years); Clark Admr. v. Hale, 209
Ky. 496, 273 SW 39 (1925) (5 years); Cover's Admr. v. Waddle, 245 Ky. 652,
54 SW 2d 19 (1932). Where the services cover a long period of time, pre-
sumption that the services were rendered gratuitously is weakened by this factor.
5 DeFever's Exr. v. Brooks, 203 Ky. 606, 262 SW 976 (1924); Cheatham's
Exr. v. Parr, 308 Ky. 183, 214 SW 2d 95 (1948); Thompson v. Hunter's Exr., 269
SW 2d 266 (Ky. 1954). Those services included in the non-personal class are
those exclusive of board, lodging, and nursing.
o Simpson, Contracts 8 (1954).
7 Williston, Contracts 4 (1938).
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facts from which a promise of payment may be inferred.8 The agree-
ment under which the Court would have allowed recovery in that case
is what should be referred to as an implied-in-fact contract, since it
was not expressed in words yet the Court failed to put this label upon
it. The failure of this Court to use the label "implied-in-fact-contract"
for this particular type of agreement has led the Court in subsequent
cases to refer to these agreements as "express contracts".9 This dual
use of the term "express contract" has created ambiguity as to what
proof will be sufficient to warrant recovery for services rendered in a
family relationship, and has even led some commentators to misunder-
stand its intended meaning in the Kentucky decisions. 10 The term "im-
plied-in-fact" should be used where applicable, so that it will be clear
that recovery can be had not only where the parties have expressed
themselves in words, but also by conduct.'
The Court's failure to recognize the essential nature of the "express
contract" also leads to ambiguity in their reference to an "implied con-
tract", since there are two types of implied contracts, those implied in
fact and those implied in law. If the Court would use the term "im-
plied-in-fact" contract when applying their "express contract" theory
of recovery, there could be no doubt that the Court meant a contract
implied-in-law when they say no contract will be "implied" in favor
of any sustaining a family relationship. The need for care in differ-
entiating these two types of "implied" contracts becomes evident in
considering cases in which the Court, although recognizing the "ex-
press contract" rule in the family relationship cases, tended to permit
recovery on an "implied contract" where the services were extra-
ordinary12 or non-personal in their nature.'3 Just what the Court has
8 Engleman's Executor v. Engleman, 31 Ky. 437 (1 Dana 1833).
9Ballard v. Ballard, 177 Ky. 253, 197 SW 661 (1917); Greens Admr. v.
Smith, 284 Ky. 448, 28 SW 2d 494 (1930); Vanover v. Vanover, 252 Ky. 308, 67
SW 2d 21 (1934); Flynn's Exr. v. Mullett, 254 Ky. 90,.70 SW 2d 978 (1934).
And in the principal case the Court lays down the standard rule that there will
be no recovery without the showing of an "express contract'. This case goes fur-
ther, however, to use the label implied in fact contract and thereby recognizes
the essential nature of their use of the term "express contract".
107 A.L.R. 2d, (1949). Herein are listed various Kentucky cases which sup-
poedly stand for the proposition that an express contract, that is, one expressed
byswords, must be shown before recovery can be had in a family relationship.
It is believed by the writer that these cases are in line with other Kentucky cases
and that the term "express contract" used by the Court means expressed by
words or by conduct of the parties.
11 It is the writer's opinion that the use of the term "express contract" as
meaning an agreement given rise to by the words of the parties or an agreement
to be inferred from the facts and circumstances surrounding the parties has not
become such a universal concept as to warrant its use with this dual meaning.
See Kellum v. Browning's Admr., 231 Ky. 308, 21 SW 2d 459 (1929).
12 Supra, note 4.
13 Supra, note 5.
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meant by "implied contract" is not clear. This is undoubtedly the end
result of the Court's failing to use the term "implied-in-fact" contract
in designating its basis for recovery under their "express contract"
rule.
In the principal case the Court picked up the term "implied-in-
fact" contract in saying:
If the proven facts and circumstances are such as to fairly show...
(a contract) ... the court or the jury trying the case will be author-
ized to find an express contract... this particular type agreement is
denominated a contract implied in fact... from what has been shown
it is apparent a form of express contract has been established, i.e., a
contract implied in fact.14
In applying this analysis of an express contract'15 the Court ex-
pressed the view that the plaintiff was entitled to recover with proof
of an implied-in-fact contract because "implied in fact contract is
actually a species of an express contract."16 This phraseology, if ad-
hered to, would aid in dispelling the cloud which has existed in pre-
vious cases.' 7 The Court's use of the term "express contract" as a valid
basis for recovery is now known to include an implied-in-fact contract.
The language used here also gives understanding to the term "implied
contract" under which the Court would not allow recovery in the past.
By making the implied-in-fact contract a valid basis for recovery
under the "express contract" rule, it leaves only the contract implied
in law within the category of "implied contract", whereas, before the
label was used, it was not known whether "implied contract" meant
implied in fact or implied in law.
14 Victor's Executor v. Monson, 283 SW 2d 175, 176-178 (Ky. 1955).
15 The language used by the Court to point out the relationship of an express
contract and an implied in fact contract was used in showing that an express con-
tract could be pleaded, and if an implied in fact contract be shown by the proof
it would be allowed to stand because an implied in fact contract is a species of
express contract. It is to be noted here that the Court, in explaining this relation-
ship in order to overcome the supposed variance, used the method of ordinary
contracts by saying it should be "fairly shown". The views of the courts in prior
cases dealing with the family relationship problem have been to the effect that
something more, i.e., "strong and convincing evidence" needs to be shown than
in the ordinary contract situation. This "something more" is required in view of
the presumption of gratuity growing out of the family relationship. Gayheart's
Admr. v. Gayheart, 287 Ky. 720, 155 SW 2d 1 (1941); Carpenter v. Carpenter,
299 Ky. 788, 187 SW 2d 282 (1945); West v. West, 312 Ky. 788, 229 SW 2d.
451 (1950).
16 It must be kept in mind that the narrow holding in the principal case was
that the lower court wrongfully instructed the jury. The view expressed by the
court here as to the relationship of the two types of contracts is, at best, dicta.
17 In Montgomery v. Smith, 288 SW 2d 628 (Ky. 1956), the most recent
case on this subject, the Kentucky Court went back to the use of the term "ex-
press contract' without pointing out that it embodied an implied in fact contract
This, concededly, is a mere play on words, but the writer believes, as pointed out
in footnote 11, supra, that the term implied-in-fact contract should be used to
avoid possible misunderstanding.
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Conclusion
Kentucky law, with the "expressions" in the principal case, has been
clarified and made consistent with the majority view' s as expressed by
the Courts in other states.' 9 It can now be said that one can rebut the
presumption of gratuity growing out of the family relationship upon
proof of either an express contract or an implied-in-fact contract. The
contract implied in law will not be allowed to rebut the presumption
of gratuity in such a situation unless the services are extraordinary or
non-personal in their nature.
Henry H. Dickinson
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AcruAL Lvy.- Pursuant to a creditor's suit, a summons and a gen-
eral order of attachment against the defendant's property were
issued and delivered to the constable for service and execution. Acting
under this authority, he attempted to attach the defendant's automobile
by merely handing him a copy of the summons and announcing that
he was attaching the car. It appears that the car was present, but that
he neither placed the writ upon it nor did any other overt act with
respect to it after the defendant objected to the attachment with some
vigor. Subsequently, the defendant drove the car daily for about
three months to and from his job which was located in another state,
until on one such trip the car was destroyed by fire while in that state.
The defendant appealed from a conviction of the crime of having
fraudulently and knowingly removed from Kentucky personal property
subject to a lien with intent to prevent it enforcement.'
HELD: Reversed with directions to set aside. Existence of a lien on
the property when it is removed from the state is an essential element
of the crime. The Court held that the general statutory rule is that an
' 8 Kentucky has always been in accord through its application of their "ex-
press contract", but the language as well as the application now tends to show
recovery can be had with either an express contract or a contract implied in fact.
197 A.L.R. 2d 23 (1949). Also see 58 Am. Jur. 523 (1948), footnote 16 and
cases cited therein.
' Ky. Rev. Stat. see. 434.210 which creates this offense provides that:
If any person shall fraudulently conceal, dispose of or knowingly
remove from this state any personal property on which there is at the
time a duly executed and acknowledged mortgage whether the same
be of record at said time or not, or any lien given under the statutory
laws of the Commonwealth of Kentucky, with intent to prevent or
hinder the enforcement of the lien . . . I he shall be guilty of the
larceny of the property ...
Hereinafter Ky. Rev. Stat. will' e referred to as "KRS".
